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Why DIBCAC Assessments Expose Compliance Gaps: Lessons from the Field

Defense contractors are reporting stronger cybersecurity compliance than ever before. But how confident are they that those claims would hold up under independent assessment? 

The 2026 State of the Defense Industrial Base Report, conducted by Merrill Research, found that the mean self-reported Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS) score reached +51, the highest recorded since the research began in 2022. 

Yet only 65% of respondents who submitted SPRS scores said they were very or extremely confident in their accuracy, down from 89% in 2025 and 94% in 2024. And despite increased compliance spending, just 1% of surveyed contractors reported being completely ready for CMMC certification. 

The findings point to a persistent challenge across the defense industrial base (DIB): demonstrating that reported cybersecurity progress is supported by actual implementation and verifiable evidence. 

It’s a challenge that comes into focus during Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center (DIBCAC) assessments. 

In CyberSheath’s October 2026 webinar, No Tricks, No Treats, Just the Facts: DIBCAC Assessments, Andrew Zoppi, Sr. Director of Compliance Operations, shared recurring issues he has encountered while supporting defense contractors through government cybersecurity assessments. 

His observations reveal several ways organizations can fall short, even after investing significant time and resources in compliance. 

Finding #1: SPRS Scores That Don’t Reflect the Actual Environment 

One of the most consequential problems Andrew encounters is a mismatch between a contractor’s reported SPRS score and its actual implementation of NIST SP 800-171 requirements. 

Contractors may face pressure to submit an SPRS score quickly to support a contract opportunity, satisfy a prime contractor, or meet an administrative deadline. But without a thorough assessment, that score may rely on assumptions rather than verified implementation. 

Andrew described working with organizations that had reported perfect scores of 110, only to discover significant deficiencies during subsequent reviews. In one example, an organization initially reporting 110 had an assessed score of 38 after its controls were examined more closely. 

The problem extends beyond the immediate score discrepancy. 

An inaccurate submission can undermine confidence in an organization’s cybersecurity representations and create potential contractual or legal exposure, particularly when those representations are knowingly false and material to government contracting. 

What the State of the DIB Research Shows 

Research suggests this challenge extends beyond isolated contractor experiences. While the mean self-reported SPRS score increased to +51, confidence in score accuracy declined for the second consecutive year. 

The findings do not establish that contractors are deliberately inflating scores. They do, however, point to uncertainty about whether reported progress can be independently verified. 

What contractors should do: Conduct evidence-based assessments against applicable NIST SP 800-171 requirements, document the basis for each score, and review SPRS submissions when relevant changes affect the assessed environment. 

An accurate score supported by a credible Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) provides a clearer basis for remediation than a perfect score that cannot be substantiated. 

Finding #2: System Security Plans That Don’t Match Reality 

An organization’s System Security Plan (SSP) should describe how its cybersecurity requirements are implemented across the relevant systems and environment. 

Andrew frequently encounters SSPs that describe intended configurations rather than the actual operating state. For example, a contractor may document a particular session timeout, access restriction, or security configuration without confirming that the technology enforces it. 

An assessor may then request a demonstration and discover that the implemented setting differs from the documented requirement. 

Other discrepancies can emerge when organizations replace security tools, update configurations, or change vendors without revising the SSP. These differences can create assessment findings even when the organization has made substantial investments in cybersecurity. 

Why It Happens 

SSPs are sometimes developed as part of an initial compliance project and treated as completed documentation. Over time, technical changes accumulate while the written descriptions remain unchanged. 

Andrew also described situations where organizations use templates that identify controls as implemented but provide little explanation of how, where, or by whom those controls are maintained. 

What contractors should do: Treat the SSP as a living document. Assign responsibility for keeping it current and incorporate documentation reviews into configuration management and change management processes. 

Every significant change should prompt a review of whether the documented implementation still matches the actual environment. 

Finding #3: CUI Scope That Expands Without Anyone Noticing 

Accurate scoping is foundational to meeting NIST SP 800-171 requirements. 

Yet Andrew identified scope drift as one of the recurring challenges he sees during assessments. A contractor may establish a dedicated environment for Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), believing that all relevant information will remain within that boundary. 

Over time, employees may begin receiving CUI through additional channels, storing it in other systems, or sharing it with personnel who were not originally included in the documented scope. 

For example, a sales employee may receive CUI in an email attachment associated with a contract proposal. If that information is received and retained in a commercial environment outside the documented CUI boundary, the organization may have expanded its compliance exposure without recognizing it. 

The same challenge can emerge through collaboration platforms, connected applications, endpoints, external service providers, and physical records. 

Why This Matters During an Assessment 

Assessors need to understand where CUI is stored, processed, and transmitted. 

If the actual flow of information extends beyond the documented boundary, additional systems and controls may need to be evaluated. This can expose security requirements that were never addressed in the original implementation plan. 

What contractors should do: Map CUI flows across business processes, not just IT infrastructure. Include contracting, sales, engineering, operations, and external providers in scoping discussions. 

Review the boundary whenever workflows, technologies, personnel, or contractual responsibilities change. 

Finding #4: Common Technical Control Gaps Identified During DIBCAC Assessments 

Some of the most persistent assessment gaps involve security technologies that organizations believe are configured correctly but have not fully validated. 

Based on CyberSheath’s experience supporting defense contractors, recurring areas of concern include FIPS-validated cryptography, multifactor authentication, vulnerability management, audit logging, incident response, and configuration management. 

FIPS-Validated Cryptography 

Organizations may use encryption technologies described as FIPS compliant without confirming that the relevant cryptographic module and implementation meet applicable FIPS validation requirements. 

Firmware and software updates can introduce additional complications when the deployed version differs from the version covered by a validation certificate. 

Contractors should review applicable Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) records, understand implementation requirements, and document how changes affect compliance. 

Multifactor Authentication 

MFA may be enabled for cloud applications or remote access but not consistently implemented across other systems or access methods where it is required. Contractors need to evaluate MFA coverage against applicable requirements rather than assume that protecting a few primary applications satisfies the entire obligation. 

Flaw Remediation and Vulnerability Management 

Some organizations perform vulnerability scans but do not consistently investigate, remediate, or verify the identified issues. Others patch systems without maintaining records that demonstrate when the remediation occurred. 

Andrew emphasized that evidence of completed work is essential when assessors need to verify implementation. 

Audit Logging and Monitoring 

Security logs may be collected without consistent review, or newly deployed systems may not be integrated into the organization’s monitoring process. Contractors should verify that required log sources are functioning, relevant alerts are generated, and audit review procedures are being followed. 

Incident Response and Configuration Management 

An incident response plan that has never been tested may contain assumptions that fail during an actual incident. Similarly, undocumented configuration changes can introduce security gaps and create discrepancies between established policies and the environment. 

What contractors should do: Validate controls through technical testing, recurring reviews, and documented operational procedures. Maintain evidence that demonstrates both implementation and ongoing performance. 

Finding #5: Acquisitions and Technology Changes That Undermine Previous Compliance Work 

Business changes can have significant cybersecurity implications. 

Andrew described situations where contractors acquired another company without adequately reviewing its SSP, cybersecurity controls, or CUI environment. 

Following an acquisition, organizations may integrate networks, migrate users, consolidate applications, or extend access to shared systems. Those changes can affect the previously documented security boundary and the implementation of applicable requirements. 

A company that accurately reported its cybersecurity posture before an acquisition may no longer have the same assessment scope afterward. Similar issues can emerge when organizations adopt new cloud services, replace firewalls, change managed service providers, or establish additional facilities. 

What contractors should do: Include cybersecurity and compliance assessments in merger and acquisition due diligence. Evaluate how planned integrations affect CUI handling, system boundaries, inherited controls, and existing compliance representations. 

Compliance reviews should be part of the integration process, rather than an activity performed after technical changes are complete. 

Finding #6:  The Legal Consequences of Inaccurate Cybersecurity Reporting 

DIBCAC assessment findings can have implications beyond remediation. 

During the webinar, Andrew discussed the case of LOGZONE, Inc., an Alabama defense contractor that agreed to pay $507,144 in June 2026 to resolve False Claims Act allegations related to cybersecurity compliance. 

The case illustrates the potential consequences when a contractor’s cybersecurity representations do not align with its actual implementation. 

Government cybersecurity assessments can bring discrepancies to light independently of a reported cyber incident. 

Not every assessment deficiency constitutes a False Claims Act violation. Legal liability depends on the applicable facts, including the nature of the representations and the relevant legal requirements. 

However, the case reinforces the importance of accurate reporting, documented due diligence, and prompt attention to known deficiencies. 

Contractors should ensure that personnel responsible for cybersecurity representations, including organizational leadership, understand the evidence supporting those claims. 

Finding #7: What Prepared Contractors Do Differently 

Not every DIBCAC assessment results in a lower SPRS score. 

Andrew shared an example of a contractor that had maintained an accurate SSP and POAM while continuing to address outstanding deficiencies. By the time DIBCAC conducted its assessment, the organization had implemented additional controls that were not yet reflected in its previously submitted score. 

The assessment ultimately produced a higher score. 

The experience illustrates the value of maintaining an active compliance program with documented progress and verifiable evidence. 

Building a More Defensible Compliance Program 

Contractors can strengthen their readiness by focusing on several ongoing practices: 

  • Maintain accurate documentation. Keep SSPs, policies, procedures, and system inventories aligned with the actual environment.
  • Validate implementation. Test controls and confirm that documented requirements are operating as intended.
  • Collect evidence continuously. Maintain dated records that support compliance assertions and demonstrate recurring security activities.
  • Track remediation. Use actionable POAMs with assigned owners, deadlines, and measurable milestones.
  • Review changes. Reevaluate scope, controls, and reporting when technologies, business processes, or organizational structures change.
  • Engage leadership. Provide visibility into SPRS scores, unresolved deficiencies, remediation blockers, and material cybersecurity risks. 

These practices help organizations identify weaknesses before they are discovered during an external assessment. 

Frequently Asked Questions About DIBCAC Assessment Findings 

What are the most common deficiencies found during DIBCAC assessments? 

Based on CyberSheath’s experience supporting defense contractors, recurring deficiencies include inaccurate System Security Plans, improperly defined CUI boundaries, incomplete multifactor authentication, gaps in FIPS-validated cryptography, insufficient vulnerability management, and inadequate supporting evidence. These issues can create discrepancies between reported compliance and actual security implementation. 

Why might a contractor’s SPRS score differ from its DIBCAC assessment results? 

Differences can arise when contractors rely on outdated documentation, misunderstand assessment objectives, fail to validate security controls, or overlook changes to their cybersecurity environment. A DIBCAC assessment may identify requirements that were previously reported as implemented but cannot be substantiated through evidence or technical verification. 

Can an inaccurate SPRS score lead to False Claims Act liability? 

Yes. Knowingly submitting materially inaccurate cybersecurity representations in connection with federal contracts can create potential False Claims Act exposure. In June 2026, LOGZONE, Inc. agreed to pay $507,144 to resolve allegations involving cybersecurity compliance. An assessment deficiency alone does not automatically establish a False Claims Act violation. 

What does the 2026 State of the DIB report reveal about compliance readiness? 

The 2026 State of the DIB research found that the mean self-reported SPRS score increased to +51, while only 65% of respondents who submitted scores were very or extremely confident in their accuracy. Just 1% of surveyed contractors reported being completely ready for CMMC certification. The findings highlight a continuing gap between reported progress and confidence in compliance readiness. 

How can defense contractors reduce the risk of DIBCAC assessment findings? 

Contractors can reduce assessment risk by validating their CUI boundaries, maintaining accurate SSPs, testing security controls, collecting dated evidence, reviewing SPRS submissions, and tracking remediation through actionable POAMs. Regular internal assessments help identify discrepancies before a government review. 

Closing the Gap Between Reported and Verifiable Compliance 

The 2026 State of the DIB findings point to an industry making measurable progress while continuing to struggle with confidence in its own cybersecurity reporting. Andrew’s experiences supporting DIBCAC assessments help explain why. 

Inaccurate SSPs, overlooked CUI flows, incomplete technical implementations, outdated SPRS scores, and insufficient evidence can all create discrepancies between what an organization reports and what assessors can verify. 

Addressing those challenges requires regular validation, coordinated ownership, and documentation that keeps pace with the business. 

For defense contractors, the goal should be a cybersecurity program capable of demonstrating compliance whenever evidence is requested. 

Watch CyberSheath’s on-demand webinar, No Tricks, No Treats, Just the Facts: DIBCAC Assessments, to hear Andrew Zoppi discuss common findings, assessment experiences, and practical preparation steps. 

For a broader look at cybersecurity readiness across the defense industrial base, explore the 2026 State of the DIB Report.